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Unknown Assets and Undocumented Services

Arguably the biggest threat to a network (IT and OT) is unmanaged and unknown assets. This can either be unknown assets that are plugged into your local OT network, or undocumented services (in the worst-case available from the public internet and without sufficient access control.

There is an overlap with the Missing Incident Detection/Reaction Capabilities as incident detection depends upon having a complete inventory of the environment. If we do not know what is in our environment, we cannot detect if something is happening to it.

Description

Unknown assets are devices or systems in an OT environment that are not properly identified or documented. These assets can include legacy systems, unmanaged devices, or unauthorized connections that are not accounted for in the organization's inventory.

This is your typical "shadow IT" problem, but in the OT world, it can be even more dangerous. Unknown assets can be anything from a rogue device connected to the network to an undocumented service running on a server. These assets can introduce vulnerabilities and weaknesses into the system, making it easier for attackers to gain access and move laterally within the network.

These assets are mostly already or will become outdated over time and introduce vulnerabilities and weaknesses into the system. Such assets can for example be used as initial access points into the network, for privilege escalation, establishing persistence or lateral movement. Having a full inventory of assets that not only includes devices but also established remote access, deployed privileges and other services is crucial to understanding the environment we are working with.

Unmanaged External Access

  • from above purdue model level 3 / IEC62443 zones/conduits
  • maintenance access
  • this can be related to missing awareness

Rationale

History has shown that undocumented assets can be used by attackers for everything from initial access, via priviledge escalation up to completing the action on objectives. Hardening and segmentation measures can only be complete if all the assets are known and under consideration. Getting an overview of my network is always and therefore the most crucial step when starting with a security program. It is also the fundamental prerequisite for every ISMS, CSMS, and other frameworks.

Known Attacks/Examples

Mitigation/Countermeasures

Design and Implementation

  • OT-environemts are static by design. During the building phase, the designer or integrator normally provides a detailed description of the environment. Changes to the environment must be documented. It is crucial to have the documentation process as part of the change process or change management policy.
  • If one starts with an already existing environment, the first step to a complete asset inventory can be to take a pen and a piece of paper, go through the location and write down every device that can be seen. This is not only restricted to manufacturing or powerplants, but all types of environments we are working in.

Operational

  • mitigations for integrators/builders: Provide the documentation to the customer/asset owner.
  • Implement asset discovery and inventory management tools to identify and document all assets in the OT environment.
  • Regularly scan and monitor the network for new or unknown devices.
  • Perform port/traffic monitoring.
  • Enforce strict access controls and authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized devices from connecting to the network. Also assume rogue devices/services in the network when designing security measures.

Next Actionable Steps

  • Conduct a thorough inventory of all devices and systems in the OT environment.
  • Implement network scanning and discovery tools to identify unknown assets.
  • Establish a process for documenting and managing changes to the OT environment.
  • Regularly review and update the asset inventory to ensure accuracy and completeness.

References

Standards

  • IEC 62443 FR 2
  • IEC 62443-2-1:2019 CM 1
  • IEC 62443-2-1:2019 NET 3.X
  • IEC 62443-3-2:2020 ZCR 1
  • IEC 62443-3-2:2020 ZCR 3.6
  • IEC 62443-3-3:2020 SR 2.X
  • IEC 62443-3-3:2020 SR 7.8
  • NIST CSF 2.0 ID.AM
  • NIST CSF 2.0 PR.AA
  • NIST CSF 2.0 PR.IR-01
  • EU NIS2 Directive Commission implementing Regulation C(2024) 7151 - ANNEX 6.7
  • EU NIS2 Directive Commission implementing Regulation C(2024) 7151 - ANNEX 11.X
  • EU NIS2 Directive Commission implementing Regulation C(2024) 7151 - ANNEX 12.2
  • EU NIS2 Directive Commission implementing Regulation C(2024) 7151 - ANNEX 12.4
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0800
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0801
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0804
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0807
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0813
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0918
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0922
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0926
  • MITRE ATT&CK M0932
  • NERC CIP ID.AM Asset Management
  • NERC CIP PR.AC Identity Management and Access Control
  • NIST 1800-23 Energy Sector Asset Management: For Electric Utilities, Oil & Gas Industry
  • NIST 1800-5 IT Asset Management

Background information

  • links to blogs, etc.

Tooling